Mr. President, I wish to

speak to the issue that is very much on

everybody’s mind today, and that is

the question of what is going to happen

on the peninsula of North Korea and

how do the actions of the United

States, with respect to the North Korean

Government’s violation of international

agreements, affect our ability

to deal with the current situation we

face in Iraq.

Let me begin by saying that there

have been attempts by people in the

media to compare the threats between

Iraq on one hand and North Korea on

the other, sometimes I think in an effort

to suggest that the President has

misplaced his priorities. I would like to

set the record straight.

I think the administration has made

it clear, and others are very clear, that

there is a big threat from both Iraq and

North Korea. Make no mistake about

it, it serves no purpose to try to compare

those threats in some theoretical

way. Both have to be dealt with in

their own way, and that also means in

their own time.

The reason the administration began

dealing with Saddam Hussein and Iraq

is because that was left over business

from the gulf war of 11 years ago where

Saddam Hussein said—promised—that

he would do certain things: That he

would, for example, not have weapons

of mass destruction or seek to acquire

nuclear capability; that he would dismantle

his missile program, and so on.

We know through our intelligence

that he has failed time and again to

comply with those requirements. He

has even continued to shoot at our unarmed

predator reconnaissance aircraft,

as well as the manned aircraft we

fly to do surveillance over the areas of

Iraq we have been flying over, the socalled

no-fly zones, ever since the end

of the gulf war.

I note that is a kind of inspection.

When people at the United Nations say

Iraq is cooperating with the inspections,

I wonder how much those pilots

think this cooperation is for them

when they are being shot at by the

Iraqis. Some cooperation.

In any event, that is unfinished business

with which we have to deal if

international agreements are going to

mean anything. The United Nations

has resolutions. Saddam Hussein

agreed to abide by them. He has not

done so. The question is, At what point

is the United Nations going to finally

decide to enforce those resolutions?

That is the point President Bush

brought to the attention of the United

Nations Security Council. They adopted

a resolution that basically gave Saddam

Hussein one last chance to show

he was in compliance.

In the judgment of virtually everyone

who looked at the document filed

by Saddam Hussein allegedly demonstrating

his compliance, it is a false

and fraudulent document and shows

that he is in noncompliance rather

than the other way around, a result of

which, sooner or later, we are going to

have to deal with Saddam Hussein.

That is where the President found himself

prior to the evolution of the North

Korean crisis.

In one respect it is timely for us to

deal with Iraq because from a military

standpoint, there is no question that

we can deal with Iraq in a way that can

minimize casualties, that does not involve

a large threat that he will attack

his neighbors. Fortunately, the Israelis

have developed a missile defense program

in the 11 years since the end of

the gulf war and will probably be able

to, through the Arrow missile defense

system, handle any kind of Scud missile

attack on them, and Saddam Hussein

has not yet acquired a nuclear

weapon, in our belief. As a result, he is

not in a position to resist a U.S. effort

to bring him into compliance with the

U.N. resolution militarily in a way

that we fear from a military standpoint.

On the other hand, the crisis in North

Korea has now broken out, and we are

faced with a question of whether military

action there is possible. Of course,

it is possible. We should never take

military action off the table. But we

know that the capability of North

Korea has evolved to the point where it

would be much more difficult to take

military action, among other reasons,

because they have long-range missiles,

they have nuclear weapons, we believe,

and they have a lot of weaponry just a

few miles across the DMZ from Seoul,

Korea, where something like 8 or 10

million people are located, including a

large number of American troops. As a

result, that situation has evolved beyond

the point where we believe it is

efficacious to use a military solution

to deal with the crisis. It is a good illustration

of why we should deal with

those problems before they get to that

point.

Fortunately, Iraq does present the

situation prior to that point that enables

us to take military action there.

Again, that crisis evolved, diplomacy

failed, and it is a crisis ripe for resolution,

if Saddam Hussein does not come

clean for the world community and the

United States, by military action.

We are not at that point with North

Korea yet. That situation arose relatively

recently. We have known for

some time there had been violations of

the agreement that North Korea made

not to produce fissile material. They finally

confessed to Under Secretary

Kelly back in September that they had,

in fact, been developing a uranium enrichment

program for nuclear weapons.

They pointed out that they still had

not, however, violated the agreement

to keep their plutonium program frozen,

but in the last few weeks—in the

last week actually—they decided to

unfreeze their plutonium program, as a

result of which that fissile material

can be produced in relatively short

order for inclusion in nuclear weapons.

It is our assessment that in a matter

of a very short period of time North

Korea could again begin producing a

number of nuclear weapons. The threat

to the world, obviously, is significant

because Korea is the largest

proliferator of weapons of mass destruction

and missiles, and if they

begin selling nuclear weapons, just

imagine what the consequence would

be if a Saddam Hussein or Muammar

Qadhafi—someone like that—would

purchase nuclear weapons from a country

such as North Korea.

The point is, that is another crisis

with which we have to deal. I do believe

it is a crisis, and I believe it is a

serious threat, but, as I said, it is a different

kind of threat from what we are

presented in Iraq.

The obvious solution is to do what

the President suggested. North Korea

has to meet a goal, and the goal is to

dismantle its weapons program in a

verifiable way. If it does not do so, it is

going to have to face consequences.

The President is willing to engage in a

dialog with North Korea, but there has

to be more than carrots at the end of

that dialog to entice North Korea to

come into compliance.

North Korea also has to understand

there can be consequences it will not

like if it fails to reach an agreement

that is enforceable, verifiable, and one

that is acceptable to the rest of the

international community.

It now has removed itself from the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This

is a very dangerous step. As a result,

the United States and the other countries

of the world need to take action.

It would be possible to do so under

chapters 6 and 7 of the U.N. Charter

which provide for action by the United

Nations in the event of a threat to

international peace and stability. We

could impose a resolution similar to

that which applies to Iraq today, Resolution

661, which essentially has quarantined

Iraq from export and import.

We could do the same with North

Korea saying no more would they be

able to export weapons of mass destruction

to generate hard currency or,

by the way, illicit drugs, since their

two biggest forms of making money are

selling illicit drugs and weaponry

which they should not be selling to

countries. That would benefit the

world. We would deny hard currency to

North Korea and help prevent the further

proliferation of these weapons of

mass destruction.

Those are actions we can take today.

Senators MCCAIN, SESSIONS, BAYH, and

I introduced legislation Monday that

provides a range of options of which

the administration can take advantage.

It ranges from dealing with the

refugee crisis in North Korea to preventing

repatriation of funds from

other countries into North Korea—

again denying hard currency—increasing

the broadcasts of Radio Free Asia

into North Korea, ensuring we are adequately

prepared to provide a deterrent

to military activity in the region. But

probably the key to it is the reimposition

of sanctions or imposition of new

sanctions, such as Resolution 661 that

applies to Iraq today.

Those are all the kinds of action that

North Korea should understand could

come about if it does not cooperate in

these discussions that the administration

would like to have. It seems to us

that it is important to put those kinds

of points in place so that in addition to

the carrots this administration has

suggested exist, there are some sticks

out there, too, because we have seen in

the past that North Korea tends to violate

the agreements it signs; it tends to

negotiate from the posture of strength.

If it has cards on the table, such as its

nuclear weapons and the ability to proliferate

these weapons around the

world, then we need some cards on the

table as well.

Right now I do not think the rest of

the international community has many

cards on the table. In effect, we need to

put an ‘‘or else’’ to the end of those negotiations

so when we sit down and

talk to them and they are intransigent,

as they usually are, there is a point our

negotiators can say: Look, you either

do this or else, and the ‘‘or else’’ has to

have some meaning.

Dr. Kissinger made another important

point, and that is the United

States should not be in this alone. This

is not our fight alone. South Korea, of

all countries, has a stake in helping to

resolve the situation, as does Japan,

China, Russia, and other nations in the

region.

It is important that those nations be

brought into this, and I am glad to see

the Chinese are willing to host some

kind of a meeting and that perhaps

other countries are willing now to be

brought into the process of discussion

so that whatever agreements are

reached, it is a product of the entire

group and not only the United States.

We should not put ourselves into the

position of being the sole party to be

blamed or for people to be looking to

for enforcement of any agreement that

may be entered into.

We have recently seen on the streets

of South Korea our friends, the South

Koreans, telling us they do not want us

in their country anymore. Now that is

a very bad turn of events because we

have been great allies. We are great allies.

We mean only to help South Korea

to provide security assurances for their

people.

What it does is tell Americans that if

we are not wanted there, then perhaps

we ought to leave. That is not the right

message to be sending when stability

in the region is so important to maintain.

It would, of course, send the

wrong signals to North Korea were we

to begin pulling our troops out of

South Korea. That is not the solution

now. Perhaps someday it will be. If

South Korea does not want the United

States to remain, obviously we should

not remain, but the right time to do

this is after this crisis is resolved, not

in the middle of the crisis.

There is a lot hanging in the balance.

It seems to me when we analyze the

situation in Iraq and in Korea, we have

to appreciate that they are two totally

different situations. There are some

parallels. Both countries are part of

the axis of evil. Both represent threats

to the United States and other nations

in the world. They both have to be

dealt with, but they have to be dealt

with in different ways. There is no confusion

in the administration policy in

this regard. There is no conflict. This

is not a matter of having disparate

policies. It is merely a matter of recognizing

that it is a complex world and

what works in one particular place

may not work in another particular

place.

That is why we have the two different

policies, both of which I hope

will involve the international community

of nations. At the end of the day,

the United States has to have a cleareyed

policy of its own, one that we are

able to apply in a way that will help to

protect our own national security.

That is why I support what the administration

and President Bush have been

trying to accomplish in bringing the

situation in Iraq to the point where we

can conclude one way or the other that

Saddam Hussein has complied with the

international obligations he agreed to,

and bring that matter to a conclusion

to enforce those agreements, while at

the same time preparing to resolve the

situation in North Korea in a way that

will not break out in some kind of military

conflict but will result in a situation

in which North Korea has dismantled

its nuclear program, its weapons

of mass destruction proliferation program,

and its missile development program

in an enforceable and verifiable

way.

I yield the floor.